In geopolitics, geography can be destiny. Few places illustrate this better than the Siliguri Corridor, often referred to as India’s “Chicken’s Neck.” This slender 22-kilometre-wide strip of land is India’s only physical link connecting the mainland to its eight northeastern states, including strategically vital Sikkim. Sandwiched delicately between Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh, it represents both a critical artery and a profound vulnerability for India’s territorial integrity and national security.
The corridor’s significance is easy to grasp when considering raw numbers alone. Disrupting this corridor would instantly sever connectivity to over 45 million Indian citizens. It would isolate an enormous geographical region, rich in natural resources yet vulnerable to instability and insurgency. In strategic terms, the corridor is an Achilles’ heel, a pressure point that external powers — or even internal agitators — can exploit, potentially bringing enormous geopolitical leverage.
Historically, the precarious nature of this corridor has been acknowledged repeatedly. In 2017, the Doklam standoff between India and China vividly highlighted the corridor’s susceptibility. Chinese forces’ push toward Bhutan’s Doklam Plateau, alarmingly close to the corridor, was a calculated move to test Indian resolve. The intense 73-day standoff underscored just how quickly tension in the corridor could escalate, leaving India vulnerable and urgently signalling the need for vigilance and readiness.
Today, new threats are emerging, reshaping India’s strategic calculus. Most pressing is the warming relationship between Bangladesh and China. Historically, India has viewed Bangladesh as a neighbour with shared cultural ties and mutual economic interests. Yet recent diplomatic trends indicate a growing closeness between Dhaka and Beijing — one that alarms strategists in New Delhi.
Chinese investment in Bangladesh has increased dramatically, particularly in critical infrastructure sectors. Projects such as the planned development of Lalmonirhat Airport, located unsettlingly close to the Siliguri Corridor, raise genuine concerns about dual-use capabilities. Such infrastructure, ostensibly civilian, could easily be repurposed for military objectives, providing China indirect leverage and Bangladesh an expanded strategic footprint. In geopolitical discourse, dual-use facilities represent latent threats. Lalmonirhat’s proximity to the corridor suggests that even without overt hostility, China’s expanded influence could complicate India’s security posture. Infrastructure often precedes influence, and influence, in international relations, frequently leads to leverage.
Chinese outreach to Bangladesh constitutes a deliberate and strategic manoeuvre to encircle India from the east, complementing Pakistan’s persistent hostility from the west. Adding to India’s anxieties is the recent rhetoric emanating from influential figures in Bangladesh. Retired Major General ALM Fazlur Rahman publicly suggested occupying northeast India if conflict erupts between India and Pakistan — an inflammatory statement revealing latent adversarial attitudes. Although unofficial, Rahman’s sentiment is not isolated. Interim Chief Advisor of the Bangladesh Government Muhammad Yunus’s cryptic warnings following his recent Beijing visit have further exacerbated anxieties in Indian strategic circles. While these statements may be dismissed as rhetorical excess, they signal undercurrents within Bangladesh’s political and military establishments that are potentially susceptible to external influence.
India’s internal security concerns amplify the external threats. Radical statements by figures such as Sharjeel Imam, who once advocated blocking the corridor to pressure New Delhi politically, expose the corridor’s internal vulnerabilities. Such provocations, though fringe and isolated, highlight that internal disruptions could align disastrously with external aggression, complicating India’s defence strategy exponentially.
Recognising these vulnerabilities, India is methodically fortifying its strategic posture around the Siliguri Corridor. A multi-layered strategy is now underway, blending infrastructure enhancement, military readiness, and strategic signalling. On the infrastructural front, India has significantly ramped up road and railway expansions, parallel tracks, highway widening, and enhanced airport capacities. These efforts aim to ensure seamless mobility of military forces and civilian supplies, reducing the corridor’s inherent fragility. Militarily, India has dramatically enhanced its readiness. Frequent troop mobilisations, exercises simulating rapid response capabilities, and intensified drone-based surveillance systems are now routine. The Indian Army’s Eastern Command, headquartered in Kolkata, has substantially increased its vigilance and response capabilities, sending clear deterrent signals to any potential aggressors.
Strategic signalling has also intensified. Notably, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma recently highlighted Bangladesh’s comparable geographical vulnerabilities. Specifically, Sarma drew attention to Bangladesh’s own “chicken necks”: the North Bangladesh Corridor, which at 80 kilometres connects Rangpur to the rest of Bangladesh, and the narrower Chittagong Corridor, a mere 28 kilometres wide. By pointing out these reciprocal vulnerabilities, Sarma implicitly warned Bangladesh that provocations toward India’s corridor would invite equivalent scrutiny and risk for Dhaka. From an economic and diplomatic angle, India has additional leverage. Bangladesh depends substantially on India for transit, energy resources, and trade. India could recalibrate these ties strategically, conditioning bilateral relations on Bangladesh’s geopolitical alignment. However, any aggressive economic recalibration risks inadvertently pushing Bangladesh further toward China’s embrace.
It’s a delicate diplomatic balancing act for New Delhi, requiring careful calibration, diplomacy, and restrained assertiveness. The interplay between coercion and cooperation defines India’s current diplomatic strategy, emphasising India’s historical preference for regional stability and collective economic advancement.
The strategic implications of the China-Bangladesh nexus, if it solidifies, are profound. India’s strategic community, including analysts such as Brahma Chellaney and C. Raja Mohan, consistently highlights the risks of a two-front geopolitical squeeze — from Pakistan in the west and potentially China-aligned Bangladesh in the east. In such a scenario, India’s military and strategic resources would be stretched thin. India would have to simultaneously secure the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor and manage insurgent movements that external actors could exploit to destabilise internal security. Nevertheless, these heightened strategic tensions also clarify India’s geopolitical priorities.
The corridor’s vulnerability starkly emphasises India’s need for robust strategic autonomy. It reinforces the wisdom of deepening diplomatic ties, fortifying military preparedness, and ensuring comprehensive infrastructural readiness. It reminds policymakers of the imperative to engage constructively yet assertively with regional neighbours, ensuring regional stability on terms favourable to Indian interests. Historically, India has balanced regional leadership with restraint, preferring diplomacy over conflict. However, given the corridor’s sensitivity, India’s strategic patience cannot be mistaken for complacency or weakness.
The Siliguri Corridor is more than just a geographical bottleneck. It symbolises India’s resilience, determination, and strategic maturity. Geopolitics teaches that strategic vulnerability can only be managed through constant vigilance.
India’s response — measured, thoughtful, but firm — demonstrates both its strategic foresight and national confidence. In securing this slender corridor, India asserts a clear message: while it seeks peace and regional cooperation, it will decisively protect its sovereignty and national interests, reaffirming the enduring strength and unity of the Indian nation.
(The writer is an IPS officer, DIG/Additional Director UPSIFS Lucknow. Views are personal)