Despite the availability of organic manure, India's 30 per cent raw material, intermediates and technical-grade pesticides are imported from China
In 2017, Pakistan and China decided to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to the agricultural sector wherein agricultural land would be leased out to Chinese enterprises in Pakistan to set up "demonstration projects" in varied areas such as seed technology. The agri-plan of CPEC connects different agricultural zones of Pakistan from Gwadar to Gilgit (PoK) and envisaged selling of agricultural produce of China in Pakistan.The project aimed to include land acquisition for joint ownership or Chinese corporations for fertilizer and other agricultural technologies apart from other areas such as textiles, cement, etc.
In March 2021, its Allama Iqbal Special Economic Zone (Faisalabad) was announced under which, 15 investors were allotted land and out of that Zhengbang Crop Protection Co. Ltd decided to invest $5.1 million to manufacture and sell fertilizers. Strongly connected to this is the Pakistan's army control over the agricultural sector ranging from fertiliser companies (Fauzi Foundation) to military farms,is unmissable. With CPEC's strategic forays in the agricultural sector and Pakistan's anti-India approach, there can be no doubt about what can conspire as "demonstration projects" that focus explicitly on experimental farming in the garb of mechanisation, development of new fertilisers and HYV crops.
Answers to questions about 'what is being tested', which fertiliser is being developed for world consumption in the name of ushering an agricultural revolution are hard to find as one is unsure about the levels of Pakistan testing its soil and water for contamination. Land grabs and denying farming rights to the locals ensures zero transparency leads to jeopardising the regional food security through the possible development of dangerous bioweapons in the name of fertilisers and seeds. The news of farmer unrest does not reach out because farmers are labelled as 'terrorists' in case of protests. CPEC, as already discussed, will magnify the threat.
Last month,the world witnessed a Sri Lanka-China face off on the issue of contaminated organic fertiliser infested with Erwinia bacteria that destroy crops. Supplied by Qingdao Seawin Biotech Co. Ltd, the incident exposed futuristic agro terror plots. As per the agreement, the $42 million fertiliser was supposed to be 'organic', but instead,it put Sri Lanka's food security at stake.
Both the developments taken together expose the vulnerabilities of the agriculture sector of those countries that import Chinese phosphates in bulk. India happens to be one of them. It is highly unfortunate that despite a huge market for organic food and the availability of organic manure, India's 30 percent raw material, intermediates and technical grade pesticides are roped in from China. The adversary's vertical positions to supply DAP/Urea increases its capacity to penetrate into India, which translates into a potential agro-terror plot.
The importance of agricultural security can be determined from multiple examples. In the 1980s, the Chilean Grape scare and the news of LTTE posing a risk to the agricultural security of Sri Lanka were examples where agro terror has been strongly associated with high payoff instead of a direct military confrontation. In the contemporary scenario, news of Jihadi material speaking of a 'Forest Jihad' in the US, Europe, and Russia point out strategies that deliberately affect the land's fertility. The country can be reminded that in 2017 India had banned the import of Fuji Apples because of the presence of micro-organisms which was a violation of phytosanitary norms capable of causing severe biosecurity risk to Indian agriculture.
Lester Brown, a scientist from the World Watch Institute,raised a fundamental question in 1995, 'Who will feed China?'. It was not merely an economic question but also a tactical one. In the last few decades, its food dependencies on meat, milk products and grains hold it back to initiate open and declared wars against India, Japan or Taiwan. Last year, Xi announced operation 'Clean Plate' in which food wastages was discouraged.
Given the Sino-Pak collaborative threat, there are strong possibilities of phosphates being deliberately laced with microscopic anti-agriculture pathogens to target the soil, crops, meat products or the land. In either case, the purpose would be to contain India militarily or cause a popular leader's loss of public support. Further, given the geographical continuity of Punjab, the 'demonstration projects might increase soil acidification and groundwater contamination, thereby putting India's future generations at risk by decreasing India's soil fertility.Thus, it becomes pertinent to include Agricultural Defence (AD) in the national security doctrine.
Today, rather than just confining to the balanced mix of fertilisers, AD should include safety of the supply chains, soil changes due to the introduction of pathogens, targeting of farm animal food and other potential weapons of environmental modifications.America has high profile biocontainment labs to study existing and emerging diseases that threaten the US agricultural animal industry and public health. The same approach is required for India.
The primary step that needs to be initiated is bringing in an 'Agro-Terrorism Preparedness Act' that could be the beginning of a national strategy for early detection, prevention, and taking counter-measures to combat agricultural bioterrorism. Such biotechnology research labs or facilities need to be under the National Security Council (NSC). They should be coordinating directly with the present agricultural institutes in every state to disseminate the necessary information to the villages across the country. Such initiatives should aim for a multistate network with grassroot participation so that even slight changes in the soil and the existing diseases of plants and farm animals are detected and the threats eliminated. Also, there has to be a detailed policy outlining the consequence management, which should be included in the disaster management preparedness.
Critical biotechnology research labs that evaluate the bio-chemical risks at the port of entry and Inland Container Depots (ICD) should be working in tandem with the NSC apart from adopting the protocols related to the disposal of the contaminated phosphates and imported fruits to avoid rodent infestations and the spread of epidemics. Further, simultaneous food emergency response must be set up in case contamination escapes detection, and new laws must be framed for those who coordinate with the enemy states concerning deliberate biological contamination. Reopening the military farms would perhaps be essential to secure military food supplies from any covert operations.
In order to test the dependencies, the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) recently announced to significantly restrict the production and export of phosphates from next year. India undoubtedly would be affected. Further, what passes off as 'available phosphates' from the side of China will have to be bio-chemically monitored. As a policy response, Russia has decided that its local farms would not be supplied with the imported phosphates, thereby hinting towards an 'inward approach that largely depends on organic manure. In India, the government is currently giving a subsidy of 140 percent on fertilisers. A sudden price rise of the phosphates will also affect financial stability and can be directly correlated with offsetting military planning. Indigenous production of bio-fertilisers holds the key.
Finally, as the tentacles of hybrid warfare spread, a holistic approach to a collaborative Sino-Pak threat is required. Today, the threat is not confined to the military frontiers and has spread further to the civilian domains, thereby blurring the limits of warfare. The responses, too, have to be innovative and in accordance with the evolving threats.
(The writer is an Assistant Professor at Central University of Punjab, Bathinda. The views expressed are personal.)