After decades of bloodshed, India’s long war with Naxalism is approaching a decisive conclusion. Once seen as the country’s most persistent internal security threat, the Maoist insurgency, rooted in a violent ideology that rejected the Indian Constitution, is now rapidly losing ground across the Red Corridor. This transformation is not incidental. It is the result of a strong revolved govt taking all the right steps at all levels — military, administrative, and ideological, under a unified national strategy. According to official figures, India saw nearly 2,000 Naxal-related violent incidents in 2010. By 2024, that number had dropped by over 80 per cent, to just 374. The number of districts affected by Naxalism has shrunk from 126 in 2013 to just six in 2025. Between 2021 and 2025, hundreds of Maoists were neutralised in operations, over 1,000 arrested, and nearly 900 surrendered. This is not just a statistical decline but it reflects a tectonic shift in ground reality, especially in central and eastern India.
One of the most significant recent blows to the insurgency came with the elimination of Maoist central committee member Basavaraj, who carried a `1.5 crore bounty. A top ideologue and operational planner, Basavaraj had for decades led brutal campaigns across tribal regions, targeting civilians and security forces alike. His death in a multi-agency operation deep in the Telangana-Chhattisgarh border region represents not only the loss of a senior commander but a symbolic collapse of the fountainhead of terror.
What marks the current counter-Naxal strategy apart from earlier efforts is its integrated and multi-dimensional character, steered at the national level by Union Home Minister Amit Shah. After assuming office in 2019, Shah launched a decisive campaign to uproot the insurgency by deploying a mix of hard and soft strategies. His leadership in revitalising the Ministry of Home Affairs’ “SAMADHAN” doctrine, an acronym encapsulating steps such as smart policing, coordination, and technology use, has ensured a coordinated and sustained push across affected states.
The central Government’s resolve is also evident in the way Unified Commands were activated across states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar, Maharashtra, and Andhra Pradesh, bringing state police and central forces like CRPF and CoBRA units onto the same operational page. These joint task forces have not only improved strike capability but also built trust among field units, enabling rapid deployment and long-term area domination.
Focus has also been made on choking the financial and ideological pipelines of Maoist groups. Urban cells that previously functioned as ideological factories and funding nodes have been systematically tracked and prosecuted under existing anti-terror laws. This has undeniably fractured the Maoist support base in academic and civil society circles.
Yet, the transformation is not limited to guns and arrests. Equally crucial has been the state’s push to restore governance and dignity to long-ignored tribal regions. Roads, schools, electricity, mobile towers, and health centres have been introduced in villages once known only as No Go zones in govt circles. In districts like Sukma, Narayanpur, and Gadchiroli, villagers now have access to banking, internet, ration shops, and employment schemes, marking the return of the state in both form and spirit.
Under schemes such as Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana and the Aspirational Districts Programme, remote hamlets have been connected to block headquarters, enabling faster movement of goods, people, and ideas. Several surrendered Maoists have been reintegrated through rehabilitation packages that include financial aid, vocational training, education, and job placement. In some areas, these former insurgents now serve as village-level coordinators in development projects, marking a remarkable arc of transformation. But the fight is not without complications. Maoists continue to leverage difficult terrain, ambushing troops using IEDs, and threatening local villagers to deter participation in Government programs. Several state forces have suffered casualties in inter-state border operations, and administrative presence in some dense forest pockets remains tenuous. Moreover, there is always a risk that if development does not keep pace with security operations, local grievances, often rooted in land alienation, displacement, and economic exclusion could resurface, resulting in boost to the maoists. The role of the political class has been a mixed bag. While the central Government has shown sustained commitment, opposition parties have been sadly politicising anti-Naxal operations. In Chhattisgarh, for instance, some Congress leaders have publicly questioned military engagements, advocated dialogue, and even participated in condolence meetings for slain maoists without acknowledging the sacrifices of security forces. In Telangana, Chief Minister Revanth Reddy’s remarks describing Maoism as a ‘social issue’ have also drawn criticism from veterans of the counter-insurgency grid. As of today, India is on the threshold of writing a new chapter in its fight against extremism. The gains made in the last five years under the strategic direction of the central Government, with Home Minister Amit Shah working hands-on with states, paramilitary forces, and intelligence agencies, are substantial and possibly irreversible. The challenge now is to consolidate peace with justice, ensure that governance takes deeper root, and that tribal communities are treated as equal participants in our nation’s democratic journey.
(The writer is commentator on socio-political issues. Views are personal)