It is high time that India developed the offensive capabilities of cyber warfare and asserted ‘digital sovereignty’
The Tawang conflict has ignited discussions on Chinese objectives and future war scenarios. On the surface, there seems to be many causes for triggering the Tawang conflict. The Chinese side was vociferous in its opposition to the ‘Yudh Abhyas’ exercise of the Indian and the US militaries along the Indo-China borders in Uttarakhand. Further, the Indian Air Force was to conduct exercises in the Eastern sector, and the Tawang transgression served as a deterrent warning for India against any display of aerial superiority and build-up along the contested region.
Although the development points towards the larger Chinese pattern of ‘Salami Slicing’, at the sub-surface level, China had different objectives to achieve from this clash. At the domestic level of China, the move could be seen as a tactic by the Xi Jinping Government to divert attention from the Tiananmen like protests being faced by the Communist Government against the unpopular covid related restrictions.
The building up of nationalistic rhetoric to divert attention from critical domestic issues is evident in Chinese transgressions, as was the case with the Galwan incident, where China was facing the backlash as the originator of the virus and its poor management.
At the regional level, the Tawang transgression is objectively different from the Galwan clash. Galwan was more strategic and operational, as indicated by the larger military build-up along the Depsang plains and the Chinese occupation of the finger ridges. On the contrary, if noticed, in the Tawang sector clashes, the Chinese forces withdrew immediately post the Corps commander-level talks, indicating that the development was largely tactical.
It was a diversionary tactic with an ulterior hidden objective. The aim of the PLA in Tawang was not occupation but rather a display of strength apart from an assessment of the Indian readiness in differing climatic conditions.
Through the clash Beijing also wanted to acclimatise its soldiers for high altitudinal warfare. In modern history, the PLA remains untested in large-scale military operations, which means it lacks the planning as well as operational tactics in a prolonged conflict in the mountains. The military has not experienced combat in decades nor fought with its current suite of capabilities and organisational structures. From this perspective, China got a ‘hands-on experience’ for a possible clash. Thus, China might not push its soldiers in open and contact warfare where heavy casualties are a direct consequence.
China may opt for offsetting India’s operational readiness through hybrid warfare. In such a case, it will play the role of a ‘shadow boxer’ in collusion with Pakistan.
First, it might incite internal strife within India through the malicious use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and disinformation campaigns. If that doesn’t work, it might choose a second option- operationally encouraging Pakistan to launch terror strikes in the Valley while launching cyber warfare with possible ‘Salami Slicing’ tactics while India is distracted. Rawalpindi’s desperation to tighten its grip over the nation after the ending of the ceasefire with TTP might motivate it to launch fresh terror strikes in the Valley. China might just assist Pakistan in this with the twin objectives of ‘rescuing’ its CPEC Project as well as testing India’s diplomatic outreach.
The next question that comes to mind is, what tools can China use against India? Recent developments under China’s Total Information warfare must be looked out for. Beijing can potentially use its advanced information technology and communications systems to gain operational advantage even before a conflict breaks out.
China has developed a hypersonic missile with a non-nuclear warhead capable of travelling at speeds of 4,600 mph. The warhead can potentially develop an electromagnetic impulse which would be capable of disrupting the power grid and electrical systems of the adversary within a 5-8 km radius. Such advanced technological weaponry has the potential to stop India from launching counter-offensive operations against Pakistan’s terror attacks.
Disruption of power and communication systems can cause mayhem just before initiating hostilities in the form of clashes in either of the sectors. The timing of the AIIMS cyberattack, which was in sync with the Tawang clash. It highlighted the strategy of China to involve in “two-front wars” at both the territorial borders and the digital contours.
The AIIMS cyberattack, along with numerous others, has highlighted the vulnerability of the Critical National Infrastructure at the civilian and military levels. India needs to be cautious, especially in the case of military infrastructure, hospitals, and other data centres. There can be a case of sensitive data theft, such as the medical data of high-profile patients and the military's top brass could be breached for differing uses.
The example of Iranian hackers publishing the personal photos and medical records of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency Chief David Barnea sets an important precedent.
Thus, the Indian government must prepare for conventional and non-conventional attacks. After the recent developments on the LAC, the Indian government has announced the deployment of Pralay tactical missiles with a range of 150-500 km along the LAC. These missiles are well suited for low-level escalations as they provide an effective deterrent. It also has the punishing capability to hit the military build-up on the Sino-Pak side without violating international humanitarian law while achieving the purpose of ‘self-defence’.
The step is indeed much appreciable. Further, the push by the Government to develop dual-use infrastructure in the country provides an impetus to military responsiveness and troop build-up in targeted areas in the case of conflicts. Also, the planned frontier highway is a step ahead in the direction to militarily counter China.
A lot needs to be done too. There is a need to establish a National Intelligence Reserve Corps on the lines of the US, which can be called upon in times of emergency when extra support is required for shorter periods. It can comprise highly technical individuals from the private sector, academia or civil society. Second, a possible establishment of a strategic technological group within the NSCS that focuses exclusively on developing new and disruptive technologies while reforming the existing ones apart from synchronising them between various stakeholders, such as the police and the armed forces. These measures will also encourage inter-agency cooperation and civil-military fusion and give a technological edge to the defensive offensive capabilities.
Further, it is high time that India developed the offensive capabilities of cyber warfare and coined the concept of ‘digital sovereignty’. Simultaneously, the development of quantum communication satellites and systems for the armed forces, which ensures the non-hackability of communication and the strategic network, would be a force multiplier in the deterrent capabilities. This technology is really useful in providing secure channels of communication to the military in cases of conflict. Such technologies will truly keep ‘Buddha Smiling’.
Tactically, developing and implementing multiple offset strategies that exploit the inherent weakness of Pakistan and China at their domestic level to limit their operational cohesiveness could be another step. Finally, at the diplomatic level, India should assertively push forward the reforming of the existing multilateral structures that is able to withstand the asymmetric power dynamics of the global order apart from the double standards of the foreign and security policies.
(Nishtha Kaushiki is Associate Professor in Central University of Punjab, Bathinda; Nikhil Sharma is a research scholar at the same University)