Indian security agencies must prepare for cross-border provocations in the form of infiltrations and terror strikes
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is an Afghanistan-Pakistan-based branch of the Taliban with a Deobandi-Wahabi sectarian orientation. The origins of TTP trace back to the Jihadi elements based in Afghanistan. These groups returned to the tribal areas of Pakistan as a consequence of the post-9/11 American war on terror and began coalescing.
The official formation of TTP took place in 2007, and in 2014, the appearance of Daesh or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in West Asia in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region complicated the situation further. The deadliness of the TTP can be recalled from the December 2014 Peshawar school attack. Consequently, Operation Zarb-e-Azb, a government anti-militant offensive in North Waziristan, and the excesses of these operations led to further alienation among the tribal militants. The two groups jointly demanded establishing an 'Islamic Caliphate' in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and beyond.
The development left Pakistan with only two hard choices. First, to cooperate with the US and finish off the entire umbrella of terror, and second, to go against the US and completely Talibanise the society by accepting Sharia law and an Islamic Caliphate for itself. The establishment at Rawalpindi agreed to none as either of the decisions would have entailed compromising its 'authority' and 'power' in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Simultaneously, the US was increasingly seen as a 'burden' for Pakistan; thus, getting the region freed from its clutches became essential. Pakistan adopted a two-pronged approach, the core at which lies the distinction between 'good' and 'bad' Taliban. The strategy first comprised letting the US finish off the terror modules based in Afghanistan, while encouraging some factions, such as the Haqqani network. This was done to use terror as an active foreign and security policy tool, especially regarding Afghanistan and India. The Haqqani network also served as crucial interlocutors between Rawalpindi and anti-Pakistan groups, such as the TTP.
Second, coax the US to the negotiating table with the Taliban and provide some 'breather' for the acceptable groups. In addition, Islamabad also complicated the 'talks' and made the Taliban a central stakeholder from a 'terrorist module', legitimising its safety for a planned US exit. In 2013 and 2014, the Taliban opened its office in Doha and Khorasan-e-Razavi (Iran) with the stated objectives of ‘peace and reconciliation,’ giving it a political and diplomatic space. Taliban thus got a stronghold, and Pakistan emerged as the most important player in Afghanistan.
As the developments unfolded, the US was forced to exit the region in 2021.
However, during the momentum of the 'grand chessboard' game, i.e., between 2018 and
2021, Pakistan was so motivated
to throw the US out of the
region that it made some glaring mistakes. First, the conciliatory approach during the ceasefire agreement backfired as it allowed the TTP to regroup and led to the proliferation of its bases in the hilly regions.
The political establishment negotiated a ceasefire agreement starting in November 2021 which was extended indefinitely in May 2022 as a process building towards conciliation. On the other hand, the military leadership under Qamar Javed Bajwa did not hesitate to carry out military counter-offensives during the same period, thereby jeopardising the peace process. It resulted in the extra-judicial extermination of many militant cadres during the process of engagement with the government. The TTP saw this as a direct contravention of the ceasefire agreement. Thus, the TTP undertook what it branded as "Defensive targeted attacks" against the Pakistani establishments to counter the Army's offensives.
Second, Pakistan also ignored the role of Noor Wali Mehsud in shifting the Jihadi narrative from a regional to a local one. The Afghan Taliban and the TTP joined hands on the grounds of commonality. As Pakistan had betrayed both during its heyday of the US proximity, the objective of avenging the killings of its leaders brought the two groups into a firm embrace. Nevertheless, in 2020, the TTP stated that it had no regional or global agenda and that its sole focus was Pakistan.
Consequently, hardcore militants started expressing loyalty to the TTP and its other affiliate or splinter groups, rapidly spreading to Punjab, Sindh, and Balochistan. Further, to deepen its outreach, TTP had started providing guerrilla war training to the Baloch freedom fighters apart from successfully creating tactical crossovers with different affiliates of Al Qaeda and ISIS.
Third, given Rawalpindi's control over the use of force and violence, it naturally expected the TTP to continue supporting the Afghan Taliban, respect the Durand Line, and keep itself involved in Afghanistan. However, as the Taliban became devoid of any strategic challenge, it became relatively free to think beyond the Afghan borders. It set out to deconstruct the image of Afghanistan as a 'strategic backyard of Pakistan' and hence perceived itself as an independent player. The developments allow Washington to regain its strategic foothold in the region. Although the United States has pledged to support the Pakistani establishment against TTP, the matter might take an interesting turn if the US, too, decides to avenge its 'betrayal' in Afghanistan. The aforesaid scenario presents a new set of challenges to Pakistan Army chief Gen Asim Munir, who is considered a hardliner on security issues. The ouster of Lt Gen Hameed as head of ISI, who had an 'accommodative' posturing towards the TTP, further strengthens the
hawkish stance of current military leadership.
Pakistan has adopted a two-prong approach wherein it has heightened the military counter-offensives against the militants and made parallel overtures to the Afghan Taliban to rein in TTP. Pakistan's call for a "reorientation in its strategy", apart from Hina Rabbani Khar calling on the Taliban to check the footprints of the TTP in Pakistan, speaks volumes of its double approach. However, the situation might escalate if Al-Qaeda, the TTP, and the ISKP open a joint terror front against the Pakistani State while engaging in parallel targeted attacks.
The Indian security agencies must prepare for cross-border provocations in the form of increased infiltrations, terror strikes on security establishments, disturbances in Kashmir, and minor skirmishes along the borders. Pakistan might resort to this tactic to divert attention from its internal disturbances. The agencies must enhance manual and drone surveillance and use drone jamming technology extensively apart from the completion of the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS) installation.
Further, forward air bases should be equipped with short and medium-range missiles, which should be in a state of operational readiness to deter any Pakistani misadventures. Perception management, both domestic and international, is required for the diversion of resources and a more significant build-up of security apparatus along the borders.
(Nishtha Kaushiki is Associate Professor in Central University of Punjab, Bathinda; Nikhil Sharma is a research scholar at the same University)