As India eyes Net Zero by 2070 and Viksit Bharat by 2047, its strategic engagement with CIS nations unlocks access to critical minerals essential for clean energy, defence modernisation, and economic resilience amid shifting global geopolitics and mineral supply chains
As India charts its vision of Net Zero by 2070 and Viksit Bharat by 2047, being the third-largest economy in the world, a people-centric clean energy transition with livelihood generation has become imperative to attain these goals. With the changing global geopolitical landscape, India must strive to maintain its position as the third-largest economy and move towards the top. Such a journey would necessarily entail a transition toward a people-centric clean energy transition, with a greater reliance on renewable energy.
The larger, volatile, war-torn global geopolitics compels the countries of the Global South to create their energy transition pathways towards a renewable energy dependence in order to fulfil their energy security needs, net-zero goals, and developmental objectives. Renewable energy technology development and access to new renewable energy technologies within India and the Global South are cornerstones to attaining such a vision. The promotion of renewable energy-driven transition pathways of India is dependent on access to critical minerals.
From lithium and cobalt for electric vehicle (EV) batteries to rare earth elements (REEs) essential for wind turbines, missiles, and radar systems, these minerals form the bedrock of India’s future economic and security needs for a strategic energy transition, which is also sensitive to the needs of its people. Yet, India’s domestic reserves and refining capacity remain insufficient to meet the surging demand for renewable energy and the needs of renewable energy technologies, leaving the nation deeply vulnerable to global supply disruptions.
With a larger dominance of China in supplying critical minerals and its associated value chain, India’s strategic clean energy transition security is vulnerable due to its larger dependence on China. Moreover, within the current geopolitical turmoil, global energy price volatility arising from Middle East, Russia, Ukraine, adds to that energy transition security vulnerability of India.
The recent export restrictions of China on rare earth magnets and gallium highlight how mineral supply chains can become the new corridors of geopolitical bargaining and shift of power balance for attaining the path of secured clean energy transition, energy security for the future.
For India, achieving energy security through a clean energy transition involves setting goals, including 500 GW of renewable energy by 2030. To ensure a strategic geopolitical stability amongst the ongoing global political instability marked by wars, India needs both energy and defense security through defense modernisation, which will include advanced fighter jets and missile systems. All these new systems depend mainly on the supply of minerals like nickel, copper, REEs, and specialised alloys. Hence, to ensure clean energy transition, energy security and defense security India is looking towards the mineral-rich expanse of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — notably Kazakhstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan — as a viable alternative within the broader context of its Net-Zero, Viksit Bharat goals, amid the changing geopolitical and clean energy transition landscape. CIS countries collectively possess vast reserves of the minerals which India desperately needs, along with a geopolitical alignment that increasingly favour diversification away from traditional dependencies.
CIS Countries as Strategic Partners
From an Indian Standpoint, Kazakhstan emerges as a particularly valuable partner, being the world’s largest uranium producer and supplying around 80 per cent of India’s uranium requirements — a linchpin of India’s nuclear energy strategy.
Beyond uranium, it has 20 million tonnes of copper reserves, significant rare earth deposits, and potential lithium resources, all of which are supported by stable governance and a welcoming approach to foreign investment.
A recent Indo-Kazakh collaboration on titanium processing demonstrates India’s commitment to developing not just mining partnerships but also domestic value chains.
Russia, despite its geopolitical challenges, remains critical to India’s mineral and clean energy transition and defense security strategy. It ranks third globally in nickel and REE reserves, producing 200,000 tonnes of nickel and 2,600 tonnes of REEs in 2023.
Russia’s industrial capacity in mining and metallurgical processing, exemplified by companies like Norilsk Nickel, precisely provides the technological expertise that India needs to develop its domestic refining capabilities.
Despite Western sanctions, India has maintained robust economic ties with Russia, suggesting that carefully structured mineral collaborations remain possible for India’s long-term clean energy transition, driven by access to critical minerals and the refining capabilities associated with them. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, is fast positioning itself as a significant player.
It holds substantial reserves of gold, copper, uranium, and potentially lithium. Recent pro-investment reforms have opened the mining sector to foreign partnerships, creating fertile ground for Indian engagement.
Its mining attractiveness ranking has steadily improved, signalling a favourable climate for strategic cooperation. Such a cooperation has to be embedded within a robust trade policy framework and institutional levers driving the framework.
Trade Policy Frameworks and Institutional Levers
India’s outreach to the CIS is not merely opportunistic but strategically institutionalised. Central to this effort is the proposed Eurasian Economic Union Free Trade Agreement (EAEUFTA), which promises streamlined trade, lower tariffs, and integrated regulatory frameworks.
For example, mineral tariffs under the EAEUFTA are significantly lower, 5 per cent for Russia and 7 per cent for Kazakhstan, compared to non-EAEU nations like Tajikistan, which imposes 15 per cent tariffs.
Embedding a dedicated “Critical Minerals” chapter within the EAEUFTA would ensure long-term supply agreements, preferential tariffs, and export control protections, mirroring successful models like the EU-Australia Critical Minerals Partnership.
Beyond multilateral agreements, India is actively pursuing bilateral joint ventures. Public sector enterprises such as Khanij Bidesh India Ltd (KABIL) and firms like Hindustan Copper are exploring investments in CIS mining projects.
For instance, collaborating with Kazatomprom in Kazakhstan or Rosatom in Russia could secure critical uranium and nickel supplies while fostering technology transfer and joint processing facilities. India’s 2023 lithium pact with Argentina sets a successful precedent for such asset-level partnerships.
Building Processing Capacity
India’s mineral vulnerability is not merely due to raw material shortages but also to a lack of domestic processing capabilities. Minerals like REEs and cobalt often undergo processing in China, creating a single-point failure risk.
Here, CIS nations can be vital partners. For instance, constructing refining plants in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where energy costs are lower and proximity to raw materials is advantageous, would reduce logistics costs and diversify India’s supply chain.
Japan’s rare metals partnership with Kazakhstan exemplifies how processing capacity can be built abroad to mutual benefit. Another critical step is towards developing strategic mineral stockpiles.
Inspired by the US-Canada Lithium Agreement, India is considering long-term supply agreements to establish reserves of essential minerals such as nickel, uranium, and rare earth oxides.
Such reserves would ensure resilience against sudden market shocks or geopolitical crises, a vital buffer for India’s Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative and national security objectives.
Geopolitical and Economic Dimensions
India’s pivot toward the CIS is not only a mineral strategy but a geopolitical manoeuvre for a futuristic clean energy transition and energy, defence security. Engaging with the CIS reduces India’s dependence on China, which controls 90 per cent of global REE processing. It also opens economic opportunities through reduced tariffs under the EAEUFTA, potentially lowering costs for India’s solar panel, battery, and defense industries. Moreover, investments in CIS processing infrastructure create local employment, fostering goodwill and deeper economic integration.
Crucially, physical connectivity is emerging as the linchpin of these partnerships. The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Chabahar Port are transforming the dynamics of Eurasian trade. Chabahar, for example, handled over 60,000 TEUs in 2023-24, reducing transit times to Central Asia by up to 40 per cent compared to traditional routes via the Suez Canal. This infrastructure ensures that mineral agreements translate into reliable, cost-effective supply chains.
Challenges and Mitigation
Challenges exist in attaining India’s long-term goal of mineral security for the clean energy transition. Russia’s entanglement in sanctions introduces uncertainty around trade and finance. Political volatility in smaller CIS nations can disrupt mining operations. China remains a formidable competitor, aggressively securing Eurasian resources through its Belt and Road Initiative. Additionally, India’s limited domestic processing infrastructure means it must still rely on external partners for critical steps in the value chain.
However, these challenges are not insurmountable. Prioritising partnerships with stable nations like Kazakhstan, investing in domestic refining technology, and maintaining diversified sourcing from multiple CIS partners can mitigate risks. Moreover, R&D collaborations involving Indian institutes such as IITs and CIS laboratories, as well as strong intellectual advocacy by independent think tanks and universities in this area, can accelerate technological and policy independence in mineral processing.
Conclusion
India’s engagement with the CIS region for critical minerals extends beyond resource diplomacy. It is a strategic requirement for national security, the clean energy transition, energy security, defense security, and for achieving goals of Net Zero, Viksit Bharat, economic resilience, and technological sovereignty. The complementarity between India’s resource needs and the mineral wealth and geopolitical ties of CIS nations creates fertile ground for transformative partnerships. Through institutional agreements, such as the EAEUFTA, joint ventures, processing investments, and logistical corridors like the INSTC, India is establishing the foundation for a resilient and diversified critical mineral ecosystem. This multifaceted strategy not only enhances India’s clean energy shift and defense modernisation but also establishes it as a key player in the emerging geopolitical landscape of Eurasia. As the global economy shifts towards green and high-tech industries, nations that secure reliable access to critical minerals will shape the future. India’s outreach to the CIS confirms its intention to be among them.
(Animesh Ghosh is PhD Scholar from IIT Kharagpur and Anandajit Goswami is CEO and Founder of TOHRI Foundation)