The NDRF, bereft of funds, resources and staff, is today a truncated outfit. The armed forces continue to be the first responders in times of natural calamity. Better we hand over the languid set-up to them and create a composite response force
Thanks to nature’s inheritance, perennial disasters are the worst holocaust humankind has been facing throughout. Incidents of natural calamities in the current decade, particularly the floods in Kashmir, Chennai, Uttarakhand and now the record-breaking flood fury in Kerala, are incidents enough to expose our hollowness in effectively combating the menace. They have raised serious questions about the efficacy of the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF). Before we get into the nitty-gritty, it will be pertinent to understand the geographical and environmental legacies that we are confronted with.
India is the 10th most disaster-prone country in the world with 27 out of 29 States and seven Union Territories being most vulnerable. Out of a total area of approx 32, 87,590 square km, 68 per cent is prone to drought; while 60 and 12 per cent are vulnerable to earthquakes and floods respectively. More alarmingly, it has been estimated that 30 per cent of all the world’s landslides occur in the Himalayas.
These figures are not sacrosanct because, of late, due to global warming and the El-Nino/La Nina combo phenomena, global climate has undergone drastic changes, resulting in unpredictable situations. And on the seismic front, the “Indian plate” that saddles most parts of South Asia and South-East Asia, has undergone a major tectonic shift, making earthquakes a more recurring phenomenon in the region. From the earlier occurrence of 1:7 years during the 1950s, the frequency of tremors of magnitude five and above on the Richter scale has now gone up to 1:3 years.
Concomitantly, man-made fury, such as mass-scale deforestation, indiscriminate construction of hydel projects and unabated timber pirating have all imbalanced the already fragile eco-balance. The looming threat cannot, therefore, be wished away. Without going into the matrix of men/material losses and political war games, we, as a nation, must imbue cogent measures in preparing for the disasters.
It is a gospel truth that even after a long hiatus since Independence, in the absence of any centralised agency, India has solely relied on the armed forces to cope with natural calamities. Thus, a need was felt to have a specialised nodal agency for Disaster Management (DM). This led to the creation of the National Disaster Response Force, under the aegis of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in 2006, with the charter to provide “specialised response to threatening disaster situation or the disaster”.
At present, the NDRF has a strength of 12 battalions drawn from various Central Police Organisations; each battalion designed to provide 18 rescue teams of 45 people each. In all, 216 teams are available. Prima facie, keeping in mind the vastness, doubt arises on its pan-Indian capability to fight disasters. Next, the DM, besides initiating immediate relief, is the explicit manifestation of restoring public services, communication, provision of medical and other administrative support. Sadly, the present organisation, bereft of captive resources such as air effort, specialised equipment and lack of wherewithal to administrative support, among others makes for a truncated outfit.
Without scratching the epochal records any further, let us study the recent Kerala floods which was the worst in the century. Lest I sound subjective and without taking away their credit, the NDRF deployed 55 teams with 38 boats that played a crucial role in providing relief in affected areas. But keeping in mind the magnitude, it drastically fell short of demand. To plug the void, axiomatically, the nation once again looked up to the Armed Forces.
True to their reputation of bailing the nation out of crises, it launched ‘Operation Madad’ — by far the largest rescue operation in the Indian history — and inducted over 100 columns (approx 80-100 personnel each), 10 Engineer Task Force, which were backed up by 1,350 boats, 37 helicopters and 21 transport aircraft. Additionally, they took upon the task of providing logistic support to the victims. Out of the 23,000 persons rescued, around 660 were evacuated by the daringly specialised Winched up Rescue Missions, while the ETF repaired/reconstructed 15 bridges and cleared 22 landslides.
Similarly, unseasonal snowfall this September led to the cutting off and marooning of a number of habitats and tourists in Lahaul and Spiti district in Himachal Pradesh. Joint Army-Air Force operations not only restored the communication services but also ensured safe evacuation of tourists.
The aforesaid analysis highlights some glaring deductions. Keeping in mind the challenges and vastness of our country, the NDRF, with just 216 teams, is woefully inadequate, ill-equipped and becomes abnegated of handling the response independently. At best, it is just able to provide ‘first aid’ or carry out peripheral tasks. Also, even as the NDRF is around, the involvement of the armed forces has virtually remained unchanged. A point worth pondering is: If as a last resort we have to fall back on the armed forces, then why not hand over the languid set-up to them and create a composite response force under their aegis comprising effective naval, air and specialised engineering support with corresponding representation from the civil administration?
This, besides encashing the inherent effective ‘inter- services’ operational coordination, would not only enhance operability but also ensure sustained relief operations and remove overlaps, resulting in avoidable loss of resources. The Army’s Corps of Engineers by virtue of their role are best suited and this organisation can be formed around this core strength. The existing number of NDRF units is woefully inadequate, and apart from working out detailed modalities, a fresh study on disaster threat should be carried out to enhance the response effort. We may consider raising specialist Territorial Army Units in disaster management that can be mobilised to provide additional support.
(The writer is a retired Infantry Officer with vast operational experience)