When Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently called for the revival of the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral dialogue, it echoed a familiar, if somewhat outdated, diplomatic refrain. Labeling RIC as an “independent mechanism,” Lavrov argued that the moment is ripe for its reinvigoration — especially given the reported easing of India-China border tensions. On the surface, it sounded like a classic Eurasian initiative: three major powers coming together to balance global influence and reinforce multipolarity. But in substance, the call appears more symbolic than strategic, driven less by genuine trust and more by Moscow’s shifting compulsions.
Originally conceptualised in the late 1990s, RIC was born out of a common need among the three nations to counterbalance Western dominance and to claim space in global decision-making. At the time, the idea of a trilateral dialogue made sense — India, Russia, and China were navigating a unipolar world, seeking to shape a more balanced international order. However, over the past two decades, the geopolitical context has transformed significantly. The foundational logic behind RIC has weakened as each member has chosen distinct strategic paths.
India’s foreign policy has evolved through sustained engagements with a host of global actors — particularly the Indo-Pacific Quad (with the U.S., Japan, and Australia), France, and key Southeast Asian partners. These relationships are grounded in values like transparency, sovereignty, and a rules-based international system-values that China does not share. Beijing’s military posturing along the Line of Actual Control, its strategic penetration into the Indian Ocean, and its use of economic coercion have deeply eroded trust in New Delhi.
Even Lavrov’s claim of reduced border tensions is disputable. While disengagement has occurred in some friction zones, the larger strategic environment remains tense. Post-Galwan, India’s diplomatic recalibration has been clear: less sentimentalism, more realism. New Delhi is no longer willing to engage in platforms that pay lip service to unity while ignoring hard truths. RIC, under these conditions, appears increasingly disconnected from the region’s evolving security landscape.
Russia’s position further complicates the equation. While defence and energy ties with India remain strong, Moscow’s growing dependency on China — intensified by Western sanctions — undermines its role as a neutral partner. This tilt is not lost on India. Moscow’s silence on Chinese aggression and its quiet alignment with Pakistani narratives in multilateral forums have not gone unnoticed. A recent decision to collaborate with Pakistan in reviving a Soviet-era steel plant only reinforces the perception of Russia’s pivot away from India’s sensitivities.
Given these shifts, Lavrov’s push for RIC should be seen for what it is: a diplomatic move by Russia to maintain relevance in Asia without Western interference. RIC offers Moscow a platform, even if only symbolically, to present itself as a balancer. But symbolism alone does not constitute strategy. For RIC to be viable, it would require political will, mutual trust, and convergence on key issues — all of which are currently absent.
India, to its credit, does not reject any multilateral platform outright. It continues to engage in RIC, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. However, such participation is pragmatic, not preferential. These forums are now largely diplomatic stages rather than engines for transformative change. India’s real focus lies on groupings where its values and strategic goals align with those of its partners. Moreover, India’s democratic ethos increasingly diverges from the authoritarian and opaque governance styles of Russia and China. This divergence is more than ideological — it affects everything from crisis response to geopolitical alignment. Without shared principles and trust, trilateral mechanisms like RIC risk producing hollow rhetoric instead of substantive results.
It’s also important to recognise that India isn’t seeking to distance itself completely from either China or Russia. What it desires is strategic autonomy — the ability to act in its own interest without being tied down by legacy frameworks or false notions of equidistance.
In this context, dialogue remains important, but only when it is based on reciprocity, mutual respect, and a willingness to address core concerns. Beijing’s attempt to compartmentalise its relationship with India — engaging economically while maintaining military standoffs — is something New Delhi has actively resisted. Under such conditions, expecting India to re-engage meaningfully in RIC amounts to ignoring ground realities. Any revival that does not address the trust deficit will remain superficial — serving little purpose beyond optics. Finally, the idea of multipolarity that once inspired RIC has itself evolved.
Today, the global order is shaped less by traditional power blocs and more by flexible, issue-based coalitions. India’s active role in areas like digital governance, climate action, and global health demonstrates this shift. RIC no longer fits into this dynamic, forward-looking vision. Lavrov’s appeal to revive RIC may resonate with diplomatic nostalgia, but it lacks contemporary relevance. The world has changed, and so has India. Clinging to outdated formats risks diverting attention from more effective collaborations. India’s future lies in agile, purposeful, and values-aligned partnerships. Dialogue is welcome, but only if it’s grounded in realism — not rhetoric.
(The writer is an International Relations scholar at JNU and a columnist. Views expressed are personal)