To balance out China, we need to build national power, and especially military power and a vibrant defence industry. Then, China will take Indian diplomacy and border talks seriously. Also, New Delhi's ‘look East' policy will appear more robust
The BJP’s prime ministerial candidate, Mr Narendra Modi, is probably the only Indian leader to have cautioned China from Arunachal Pradesh’s soil to give up its expansionist mindset. To persuade China to do so will require an entirely different policy than the one being pursued since decades against both China and its strategic ally, Pakistan. A nuanced tweaking of the traditional thinking will not do.
Delhi should know that its present policies of ‘appeasement’ of China and ‘confrontation’ with Pakistan have not been successful because China and not Pakistan has actually unleashed a proxy war against India; the Pakistani Army is merely the face of the Chinese game. It is China’s fulsome support to Pakistan in terms of nuclear weapons, restrictive missiles and conventional war capabilities that has emboldened it to continue unabashedly since the 90s without worry of reprisal with its low intensity campaign in Jammu & Kashmir against India. Has China ever asked the Pakistani Army to discontinue terrorism against IndiaIJ The way out of this strategic logjam for India is to adopt a ‘balancing’ policy for China and an ‘accommodative’ one for Pakistan. let alone a two-front war, a war with China is neither necessary nor winnable. Yet, ironically, the essential road to stability with China goes through Pakistan.
A ‘balancing’ policy for China will first require understanding four home truths. First, China and not Pakistan is India’s main strategic and military threat. Second, China respects power, especially military power and detests appeasement which it views as a sign of weakness. Third, Beijing will not resolve the disputed border or agree to a line of Actual Control on the ground except on its own terms as it ensures India’s strategic confinement in South Asia. Fourth, it is impossible for India to match China militarily in the six war domains of land, sea, air, space, cyber and nuclear weapons. Hence, Indian land forces’ shift in military strategy from ‘dissuasion’ to ‘deterrence’ under which the Indian Army has sought raising of a new mountain strike corps and the Indian Air Force hopes to build 42 combat squadrons strength is counter-productive. While it will not deter China, it will spur the Pakistani military to pursue an unnecessary arms race. If India instead were to build excellent land and rail connectivity to the 3,488km border, it would discourage Chinese aggression much more than air lift capability (which India is building) which in comparison will always be limited.
China, which is pitted against the United States for global supremacy, is not likely to assess a border war with India as worthy of its grown stature. Hence, it will continue to apply pressure on the disputed border through military coercion (like in April-May 2013 in north ladakh), regular intrusions across the lAC, and by increased military activities in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir under cover of land trade across the Karakoram Highway from Xinjiang to Gwadar port. This will keep India on the backfoot, being conscious that in case of hostilities, few countries would openly oppose China.
Therefore, balancing China first and foremost means building up of national power, especially military power and a vibrant defence industry. This will beget two advantages: First, China will take Indian diplomacy and border talks seriously. And second, India’s ‘look East’ policy where it seeks closer ties with Japan, Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries and other friendly littoral nations will appear robust and genuinely impress China.
Next, the Dalai lama, his Government-in-exile and the Tibetan diaspora in India are a strategic weapon against China if handled dexterously. Nothing perturbs China more than the possibility of outside support to the Tibetan cause as it militates against its core objective of unification of Tibet which must wait, at least, till the passing of the Dalai lama. For this reason, Chinese seek regular assurance from India on its acceptance of Tibet as a part of China; something it does with the United States as well. Now, if the US President can meet the Tibetan spiritual leader who has renounced politics, surely the Indian leaders can confabulate with him as well. To temper Beijing’s protestations on this issue, Chinese could be advised to desist from their covert support to numerous insurgent groups in North-East India.
The next element of balancing China concerns bilateral trade which has galloped to $60 billion annually with deficit of nearly $28 billion in China’s favour. Given China’s manufacturing prowess, computer hardware and cyber expertise, it would be imprudent to allow Chinese companies to enter areas sensitive to national security. Thus, a careful monitoring of Chinese intentions (most Chinese companies are Government-owned), and a plan to minimise trade deficit are a must for successful trade with China.
Probably the cardinal imperative to build stable relations with China is for India to minimise bilateral hostility with Pakistan, which will not be easy, primarily because this has been a favourite whipping boy for both sides. While there are too many bilateral acrimonious issues, the most important is the Kashmir resolution. The next Indian Government could revisit the 2007 Manmohan Singh-Pervez Musharraf formula for Kashmir resolution on which, interestingly, the Pakistani Army and the Hurriyat leadership appear on-board. This will not be easy as the Nawaz Sharif Government in Pakistan wants to start with the 1999 lahore declaration and the soon-to-be installed government in Delhi may also desire to commence afresh. The challenge within Pakistan will be to have both its civilian and Army leadership as equal stakeholders to a resolution. And, the challenge in India will be to have both the ruling and opposition parties agree to a Kashmir resolution. The good thing, however, is that it is in both countries’ interest to approach the Kashmir resolution sincerely.
If done, India will derive three major benefits: First, the civilian Government in Pakistan will get a substantive hold over its country’s foreign and national security policies presently being run by the Pakistani Army. This will open doors for genuine bilateral trade and people-to-people interaction between the two neighbours. Second, as both militaries will be able to dispense with their offensive forces, India could then use a bulk of them against the Chinese border for building deterrence. And third, India could finally have a lean and mean military within reasonable annual defence allocations to support its foreign policy objectives in its area of interest.
Pakistan will also get three advantages from the Kashmir resolution: First, with its eastern flank secure, the Pakistani Army can devote itself wholeheartedly to its turbulent western front. Who knows it may even agree to work with India to provide stability in AfghanistanIJ Second, Pakistan will be better poised to take on internal terrorism which is sapping its vitals. And third, given improved overall relations with India, Pakistan with its potential, geo-strategic location, and a professional Army will be a natural choice to emerge as a leader in the Islamic world. India must understand that it will be easier to build bridges with Pakistan than with a determined China which will never accept a rival in Asia.
(The writer is a former Indian Army officer and now Editor, FORCE, a newsmagazine on national security)