The biggest shortcoming of all treaties signed with China since 1976 has been the absence of military advice in border policy-making. Even during the recent ladakh crisis, the Army Chief was called only on the 19th day to give a briefing
That the Chinese gamble had paid off could be the reason for Premier li Keqiang’s broad smile which flashed in all photographs during his recent meetings with Indian leaders. less than a month before Mr li was to leave for his first destination abroad (India), Chinese border guards intruded 19 km deep inside Indian territory in ladakh, held New Delhi on tenterhooks, got what they wanted, and sauntered away. What lay shattered was India’s national dignity; yet Union Minister for External Affairs Salman Khurshid did not consider it necessary to ask the Chinese why they upped the stakes.
China, however, thought it important to explain its action. Two days before Mr li’s arrival, Qin Gang, Director General, External Publicity, in the Chinese Embassy in Delhi, gave two take-aways from the ladakh tension: First, China was pleased that India did not let the incursion affect overall bilateral relations; and second, there was a need for quieter border. To be sure, these two issues set the agenda for Indian talks with the Chinese leader.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told the visiting Premier that peace on the border (quieter border is how China had put it) is essential for growing bilateral relations. The mechanism to accomplish this was handed over by China in its Border Defence Cooperation Agreement; India was earlier hesitant to consider the BDCA which had been on the table for some time, and could well be the reason why Chinese troops decided on the ladakh adventure. The BDCA is not another means to resolve territorial transgressions or even incursions.
It instead argues that both sides should have minimal troops and equipment on the border, as enunciated in the September 1993 border peace and tranquillity agreement, for a quieter border. When implemented, this will place India in a militarily disadvantageous position to defend its territorial integrity. China, to be sure, has awesome land and air means to transport troops and equipment quickly for a border war, something that India cannot match.
It is agreed that the BDCA will be discussed during Union Minister for Defence AK Antony’s visit to China and the two special representatives will work fast to bring the BDCA into force. While the border may become quieter, India would remain devoid of the military muscle to implement an effective China policy. Worse, there are indications on the ground to suggest that the Indian military build-up plans and patrolling in sensitive areas by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police and regular troops have been temporarily halted pending agreement on the BDCA.
India seems to have compromised on the border issue, which is its core-interest area, defined as something at the heart of a nation’s dignity, sovereignty and independence. For China, Tibet is a core-interest area; Beijing will go to war on this issue. Having agreed to talks on the BDCA, which is China’s agenda, India must ensure that it does not restrict its military capability on the border to remain below the threshold of military activism, so that Chinese troops’ incursion go unchallenged yet again in the future.
Experience suggests that this will be a tall order for the Manmohan Singh Government. More to the point, all dispensations in New Delhi since then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 China visit, have in varying measures sought not to displease China. This contrasts with a famous Chinese saying that emotions should not play a role in policy-making. To make this happen, two corrective measures at the strategic level need to be taken.
First, India’s China policy requires a regular meeting of minds at the political level. Just as the Prime Minister had invited leaders of main political parties to a private dinner hosted for the visiting Chinese Premier at his residence, he should enlarge the ambit of people tasked with the China policy; from the Cabinet Committee on Security that he heads to a larger forum that includes all national political parties’ senior representatives. This will beget three advantages: First, national security issues starting with the China policy, will progressively rise above petty politicking which, given the geo-political realities in Asia, needs a firm handling. Second, armed with a China policy acceptable to all national parties, the Government will be evenly matched to take on the Chinese one-party consensus devoid of flip-flops.
And, third, the China Study Group under the National Security Adviser will no longer be the sole adviser to the Government. Various political parties will bring fresh ideas and options on the table; the consensus thus arrived on China policy will be top-down and not bottom-up as has been the case, at least since India entered the era of coalition politics.
Second, all political parties should realise that China, and not Pakistan, will be the main strategic and military threat to India. While Beijing may never go to war with India, it will certainly employ coercive diplomacy (like the recent one) to have its way. To take on this challenge, India will need systemic reforms in its defence set-up to ensure that its military capabilities are utilised optimally. This could be done in two steps: The three defence services Chiefs should become regular advisers to the Government on border issues. In fact, the biggest shortcoming of all treaties signed with China since 1976 when diplomatic relations were established after the 1962 war has been the absence of military advice in border policy-making. Even during the recent ladakh crisis, the Army Chief was called only on the 19th day to give a comprehensive briefing to the political leadership.
The other systemic reform in defence will require a multi-party approach. Just like the framing of China policy by all political parties, there is a need for far-reaching reforms in defence management by learning lessons from the US Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 which paved way for successful air-land battle doctrine devised in late 70s at a time when inter-service rivalry was at its peak in the US military. Given Chinese operational concept of unified command for the Tibetan theatre facing India, it is necessary that the Indian Army and Indian Air Force evolve a single war doctrine (air-land doctrine) for providing credible deterrence. At present, the army and the air force have separate doctrines, which cannot match Chinese unity of command.
The essential issue is that once China is recognised as the main threat, a top-down approach cutting across political party lines should be adopted to revisit the China policy making and defence management to grapple with geo-political realities.
(The writer is a former Indian Army officer and now Editor, FORCE, a newsmagazine on national security)