The biggest threat to India’s security is not the Islamic State or even the communal situation within the nation. It is the rising tide of left-wing extremism. Without solving this problem, India can’t leverage its full potential
We have to thank the British for locating cantonments in the hills across India to escape the blazing heat of the plains and increase longevity and productivity of the troops. last week, the maxim was ably demonstrated by the Army Brigade at Kasauli while organising a strategic seminar on terrorism, the brainchild of veteran lt Gen Kamal Davar. Assembled at the picturesque Kasauli Club were renowned specialists in the trade like Ajay Sahni, lt Gen Vijay Kumar Ahluwalia, Manoj Joshi and myself. Collectively they brought to the table the knowledge and experience of combating militancy, insurgency, terrorism and left-wing extremism (lWE).
In this day and age, the scourge of terrorism heads the charts of threats and challenges to mankind. The 13th century assassins, recalls Marco Polo in his travels along the Silk Road to meet the great Mongol, Kublai Khan, were terrorists “drugged and manipulated to do their masters’ bidding” — much like contemporary terrorists. The Americans spearheaded the international response (crusade) to 9/11 with the ‘global war on terrorism’, soon tweaked it to ‘US military engagement/commitment overseas’, and now call it ‘combating violent extremism’. The focus of the terrorism seminar was on key aspects of India’s internal security.
The good news: Despite forecasts of doom and gloom, a chart on fatalities due to terrorism between 2005 and 2016 displayed at the seminar showed a dramatic decline in figures, from 1,739 in 2005 to 174 in 2015 in Jammu & Kashmir. Across the board, there is a sharp drop in insurgency in the North-East (717 to 273) and in lWE (717 to 251). Islamic extremism and Hindutva extremist figures have dropped from double to single digits.
The Islamic State, which is losing ground in Syria and Iraq, has made no headway in India. We were told that in the country with the second largest Muslim population in the world of 183 million, only 23 Indians had joined the Islamic State of whom six had been killed in Syria. Two years after the declaration of the Caliphate, all-India figures of Muslims who are in the Islamic State net are 25 arrested, 30 detained and 35 deported.
The communal situation in the country is also on the mend since the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the 2002 Gujarat violence, though it is still sensitive and vulnerable. Overall, statistically atleast, the internal security scenario is looking up. This, it was noted, was in conformity with the end of the era of World Wars and the arrival of the most peaceful period in recent history — a claim not in sync with popular perception.
The lWE picture is more promising than in the past mainly after the wake-up call on April 6, 2010, when 76 Central Reserve Police Force personnel were killed in Chhattisgarh. 2009 and 2010 were the most violent years with fatalities rising to 997 and 1,180 respectively. Of the 640 districts, the Maoist-affected ones have dropped from 239 to 106 districts, of which 39 are critically affected. This is a significant reduction in the Maoist hold of the mainly rural, tribal and Dalit population with low human development indices. The centre of gravity of lWE is in the Bastar belt which accounts for 60 per cent of the violence.
Notably, several myths have been created around the Maoists about the Red Corridor from Pashupati in Nepal to Tirupathi in Andhra Pradesh. Also, there are no Maoist liberated Zones as claimed. liberated regions are those which are not contested by the State and have their own administrative machinery, which is not the case. These counterclaims are valid only on account of terminological in exactitude though Government has admitted there are large tracts of areas in Bastar where the Indian flag is rarely flown. Following the 2010 Chhattisgarh ambush, the State panicked and called in the Army to carry out a typical psy-ops by deploying troops for training in the heart of Maoist land.
In July 1971, two Army Divisions and the elite Parachute Brigade were launched in West Bengal to subdue the resurgence of Maoist terror which had the subsidiary effect of ensuring a Congress electoral victory. While the Army should assist and train paramilitary forces, it must not get involved in operations.
The fundamental question posed at the seminar was: The longevity of the Naxal movement which started in 1967. The resident expert felt that the Maoists may be forced to end their campaign when its costs begin to exceed the gains and start to hurt the movement. He felt that by 2020, the Maoists will splinter into a number of smaller units indulging in extortion and criminal activities. P Chidambaram, as Union Home Minister in 2010, had put the Maoist’s expiry date at three to five years whereas his Home Secretary, GK Pillai, extended their shelf life by five to 10 years.
Another question posed by a speaker was: Why was it that India had managed to resolve only one insurgency in the last 60 yearsIJ The insurgency in Mizoram (and Tripura) was resolved by a mix of military and political means with the Army creating an environment conducive to political resolution. The speaker said the tardy pace of resolving insurgencies was due to ‘strategic passivity’ while another speaker attributed it to Índia’s infinite patience — strategic patience — by placing the lid on violence and trying to tire out the insurgents.
A connected comment referred to the state’s ‘strategic reluctance’ to resolve the political problem due to the nexus between local politicians and insurgents. The basic problem though is with India’s policy on use of force — minimum, proportionate and applied in good faith. In the 21st century, only the Khalistan terrorism in Punjab and liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam terrorism in Sri lanka have been defeated militarily. It would be difficult to replicate military victories such as these, elsewhere. Even if it was achievable, India has disavowed a military solution.
The constant underlying violence are ‘root causes’. These are grievances that led to violence in the first place, which have to be addressed for political reconciliation. In the end, terrorism of whichever hue will be neutralised only by overcoming the ideology of hate and defeating the motivation and military capacity to prosecute it. For greater effect, India has to introduce more dynamism in its use of force, exhibiting strategic anxiety and urgency in resolving insurgencies and dealing with terrorism.
No way should the Army be sucked into defusing lWE. Without resolving the internal security problems urgently, India cannot tap its full potential for growth and development. That is the simple message from the Kasauli Strategic Studies Cell.