On January 8, 2013, Indian soldier Hemraj was beheaded by the Pakistani troops in the Mendhar area of Poonch.

On August 6, 2013, an Area domination patrol of the Indian Army was once again targeted by the Border Action Team (BAT) of the Pakistan Army in Gulpur area near Chakan-da-bagh in Poonch and five Indian soldiers were killed while one soldier received injuries in the audacious strike.

On October 28, 2016, an Indian soldier was once again beheaded by the terrorists in Macchal sector of Kupwara .

In all these three daring strikes, the terrorists/Pakistan Army regulars faced no or token resistance on ground zero.

Even the sophisticated advance warning systems failed to alert surveillance grid headquarters to repulse the attack.

The recent strike has once again raised question marks whether the standard operating procedures (SoPs) were followed or bypassed by the local field commanders which resulted in the strike and costed precious life of an Indian soldier.

Indian Army had claimed one terrorist was killed in the encounter close to the line of Control but few others (exact number not clearly known) managed to retrieve safely inside PoK.

A formal enquiry would determine the facts in the days to come.When this correspondent contacted senior Army officers of the Northern Command to confirm whether any formal enquiry has been initiated they were not available for comment. Calls made to Defence PRO in Udhampur were also not responded.

Speaking to The Pioneer a retired Army officer who has served in the same sector said,  “the worrisome part is how the infiltrators managed to come closer to the line of Control, after negotiating dense jungles and undulating terrain “. The retired officer claimed,  “I am raising this question because due to simmering border tensions the Indian Army is already in a state of high alert and even the Intelligence agencies had warned of BAT operations well in advance. “

Talking about specific failures which could have resulted in mutilation of lone Indian soldier at the hands of terrorists, the veteran officer said,  “The patrol party may have lost touch with the base centre via radio network and failed to communicate the ground situation. “ The soldier must be moving alone in the jungle area and his partners failed to detect the presence of terrorists when  they targeted him.

He said all these loopholes would be known once detailed enquiry would be conducted by the Army headquarters.

He said sitting away from the field area  “I cannot comment whether the strength of the area domination patrol was trimmed down in the area or any other SOP was bypassed in deciding their strength. “

The officer said,  “The enemy location and the nature of terrain and the distance between the two adjoining posts are the three crucial factors which determine the strength of the area domination patrol in different locations. “

The officer said in this case it is difficult to say,  “Whether the field commanders on ground zero had made any tactical error of reducing the strength of the area domination patrol or the large portions of the thickly vegetated, undulating terrain was left unmanned due to which the members of the Border Action team managed to sneak inside the Indian territory to carry out the  “hit and run “ operations.

Referring to January 8, 2013 beheading, the retired officer said the standard operating procedures were reportedly amended and the local commanders were directed not to dilute the strength of the area domination patrol.

Now the question arises when the North Kashmir district of Kupwara was witnessing gradual surge in the incidents of ceasefire violations and infiltration bids ahead of peak winter season what measures were taken on ground zero to tackle the aggression of the Pakistani Army supported by leT and JeM cadre.